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Abstract: In a series of articles in this journal, Michael Tye (2002) and Paul Noordhof 
(2001, 2002) have sparred over the correct explanation of the putative invalidity of the 
following argument: the pain is in my fingertip; the fingertip is in my mouth; therefore, 
the pain is in my mouth. Whereas Tye explains the failure of the argument by stating 
that “pain” creates an intensional context, Noordhof maintains that the “in” in “the 
pain is in my fingertip” is not spatial, but has state-attributing character. In this paper, 
we offer a third account, explaining the failure of the argument through state-
attributing pragmatic implicatures. Empirical evidence is provided in support of this 
account.  
 
Consider the following argument, first put forward, so far as we are aware, by Block (1983, 517):  
The pain is in my fingertip.  
The fingertip is in my mouth.  
Therefore, the pain is in my mouth.  
Block asserts that “the conclusion obviously does not follow” and attempts to explain why the 
argument fails. His view is that the predicate “in” works differently for mental particulars, like 
pains, than for physical objects. Other authors—most notably Tye (1995, 2002, 2005) and 
Noordhof (2001, 2005)—have shared Block’s intuition that the pain-in-mouth argument fails, but 
have offered competing explanations of why it fails. In this paper, we will offer a new, pragmatic 
diagnosis of the intuition that the pain-in-mouth argument goes wrong, contrasting this with the 
accounts offered by Tye and Noordhof. We then offer empirical evidence that our explanation 
better accounts for people’s judgments concerning the pain-in-mouth argument. 
 
1. The Strategy  
Both Tye and Noordhof utilize the following three-step strategy to support their preferred account 
of the failure of the pain-in-mouth argument:  
(i) introduce an analogous argument;  
(ii) give an explanation why the analogous argument fails;  
(iii) apply that explanation to the pain-in-mouth argument.  
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Thus, according to Tye, the following is analogous to the pain-in-mouth argument:  
(T1) I want to be in City Hall.  
(T2) City Hall is in the ghetto.  
(TC) I want to be in the ghetto.  
Tye then notes that (TC) does not follow from its premises because “want” creates an intensional 
context. Finally, he argues that the pain-in-mouth argument fails for the same reason. Tye 
maintains that pains are conceived of as representational states such that “pain” creates an 
intensional context.1 The impact of Tye’s proposal can hardly be underestimated. If he is right, 
then he provides substantial evidence for the view that pains are conceived of as representational 
states. 
Although Noordhof is also in favor of a representational view of pain, he believes that Tye’s 
explanation is mistaken and, hence, cannot be called on to support representationalism. Instead, 
Noordhof (2001) puts forward a different analogous argument:  
(N1) There is a hole in my shoe.  
(N2) The shoe is in the box.  
(NC) There is a hole in the box.  
This argument fails, so Noordhof contends, because there is a non-spatial sense of “in”—the 
state-attributing sense—that is at work in statements such as “there is a hole in my shoe.”2 
Applying step (iii) of the stated strategy, Noordhof argues that the same is true of the pain-in-
mouth argument: while the “in” in “the fingertip is in my mouth” is used spatially, the “in” in 
“the pain is in my fingertip” attributes something painful to my fingertip. Consequently, the 
argument can be shown to fail without positing the existence of an intensional context.  
So, who has provided the right analogy? We believe that neither of the two explanations offered 
gets to bottom of the general intuition driving the sentiment that the argument fails, although our 
own account takes inspiration from both proposals. Against Noordhof (and in line with Tye) we 
hold that the “in” in “the pain is in my fingertip” retains its spatial meaning, but against Tye (and 
in line with Noordhof) we believe that the failure of the pain-in-mouth argument is explained by 
a state-attributing factor, namely that there is something wrong with the place in which there is a 
pain. However, instead of proposing a semantic solution to the problem, we argue that it is best 
explained through pragmatic implicatures.  
 
                                                 
1 As Tye (1995, 296) puts the point, “one can have a pain in a finger without having a pain in the mouth 
even if one’s finger is in one’s mouth (just as one can believe that one is in Vancouver without believing 
that one is in Canada, even given that Vancouver is in Canada).” See also Carruthers (2000, 120). 
2 For further examples with a similar structure, see Noordhof (2002) and Noordhof (2005). For a similar 
suggestion on how to explain the failure of the pain-in-mouth argument, see Bain (2007, 198). 
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In order to illustrate our account, consider the following argument that we take to be analogous to 
the pain-in-mouth argument:  
(1*) There is tissue damage in my finger.  
(2*) The finger is in my mouth.  
(C*) There is tissue damage in my mouth.  
In the argument, the “in” appears to have a purely spatial meaning in the premises as well as in 
the conclusion. Further, “tissue damage” does not create an intensional context. And, yet, we are 
inclined to judge that the argument fails. We contend that it fails because there is a tension 
between what is implicated by the two premises and what is implicated by the conclusion: the 
conclusion seems to carry the implicature that something is wrong with the speaker’s mouth, 
while the premises carry no such implicature. 
In order to illustrate how the conversational implicature is activated, consider (C*). According to 
our account, this sentence can be true for a variety of reasons, including that the speaker has put 
an injured finger in her mouth or that she has injured the inside of her mouth. The Gricean 
maxims of relevance and manner (Grice, 1975) dictate that we should say only things that are 
relevant or important and we should say them in a way that is clear. In most circumstances, it 
would hardly be relevant for a speaker to say that she has tissue damage in her mouth if she had 
just put an injured finger in her mouth. And saying that there is tissue damage in her mouth 
would hardly be a perspicuous way to convey this state of affairs. If she has injured the inside of 
her mouth, however, the claim that there is tissue damage in her mouth will be both relevant and 
clear in most conversational settings. 
Let us now consider the pain-in-mouth argument again. If we are right in claiming that the 
argument we presented above is analogous to the pain-in-mouth argument, then no non-spatial 
meaning of “in” needs to be posited to explain its failure. Nor do we need assume that “pain” 
creates an intensional context. The pain-in-mouth argument fails because the conclusion 
implicates that something is wrong with my mouth, whereas no such implicature can be derived 
from the premises. Accordingly, it would be wrong to classify the pain-in-mouth argument as 
invalid. The conclusion is not necessarily false, but simply has a misleading implicature given the 
two premises. 
How can we decide which of these three accounts provides the best diagnosis of the failure of the 
pain-in-mouth argument? To answer this question, we need to consider what is being claimed 
when it is claimed that the argument fails. The discussions of this argument are typically phrased 
in terms of invalidity, which might suggest that the issue is a technical one. This is misleading, 
however, since whether the argument is valid or invalid depends on how we interpret the key 
phrases in it. As Block (1983, 517) notes in his original discussion of the argument, it is “valid 
for the ‘in’ of spatial enclosure.” Against this, he asserts that if we suppose the premises “are true 
in their ordinary meanings” then “the conclusion obviously does not follow.” Block’s goal is then 
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to draw out the ordinary meanings so as to explain why the conclusion does not follow. And, we 
believe, something similar is going on in Tye and Noordhof as well.3 Understood in this way, the 
goal of an account of the failure of the pain-in-mouth argument is to articulate the ordinary 
understanding of the premises and conclusion of the argument so as to diagnose the intuition that 
something is wrong with the argument.  
Accepting the above articulation, the alternative accounts of the failure of the argument would 
appear to be open to empirical investigation. We can test both the underlying assumption that 
people will judge that the conclusion does not follow from the premises, and we can test which 
“analogous” arguments they make similar judgments about. In the next section, we detail three 
experiments testing our account against those given by Tye and Noordhof. 
 
2. Empirical Evidence  
One of the most heated debates in the philosophy of pain revolves around the question of whether 
pains are conceived of as mental or bodily states (Aydede 2005, Hill 2005). Those who promote a 
bodily conception of pain (Reuter & Sytsma forthcoming, Sytsma & Reuter 2017), often argue 
that the semantics of statements like “I have a pain in my shoulder” indicates that pains inhabit 
body parts (and not the mind). Proponents of the mental view of pain then often claim that the 
semantics of pain reports need to be given a different spin, e.g. Tye’s proposal that “pain” creates 
an intensional context. Irrespective of how pains are conceived of, no one denies that people 
locate things like tissue damage in their body parts. Our account of the pain-in-mouth argument 
predicts not only that people will tend to judge that this argument fails, but that they will also 
tend to judge that corresponding arguments where “pain” is replaced with terms like “tissue 
damage” will also fail.4 Importantly, however, our account only predicts that people will judge 
that the argument fails when the conclusion misleadingly suggests that there is something wrong 
with the speaker’s mouth. For example, if “pain” is replaced with “paper-clip,” we predict that 
people would tend to accept the conclusion since it would not seem to imply that there is 
anything wrong with the speaker’s mouth.  
To test these predictions, in our first study we gave participants one of four arguments—either a 
version of the pain-in-mouth argument, or a variation in which “pain” is replaced with 
                                                 
3 For instance, Tye (2000, 35) treats the failure of the pain-in-mouth argument as one of “a clear range of 
commonsense facts that any theory of phenomenal consciousness needs to explain.” Against this there is a 
growing series of results suggesting that many of the commonsense facts that philosophers have claimed 
about phenomenal consciousness are not in fact commonsense (e.g., Sytsma & Machery 2010; see Sytsma 
2014a for discussion and Sytsma & Buckwalter 2016, Part IIC and Sytsma 2014b for further examples of 
work in the area), including a number of claims that have been made about pains (e.g., Sytsma 2010, 
Reuter 2011, Reuter et al. 2014). 
4 “Tissue damage” is an especially relevant comparison, since Tye argues that feelings of pain represent 
tissue damage (e.g, 2005, 100-101; 1997, 125). 
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“inflammation,” “tissue damage,” or “paper-clip”: 
The (pain/tissue damage/inflammation/paper-clip) is (in/on) my fingertip.  
The fingertip is in my mouth.  
Therefore, the (pain/tissue damage/inflammation/paper-clip) is in my mouth.  
Participants were then asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with the conclusion 
of the argument using a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 with “Strongly Disagree,” at 4 with 
“Neither Agree nor Disagree,” and at 7 with “Strongly Agree.” Responses were collected from 
174 participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk.5 As predicted, we found that while most 
participants disagreed with the conclusions for pain (M=2.43), tissue damage (M=2.53), and 
inflammation (M=2.86), most participants agreed with the conclusion for paper-clip (M=6.10). 
The mean values for “pain,” “tissue damage,” and “inflammation” were all significantly below 
the midpoint, whereas the mean value for “paper-clip” was significantly above the midpoint.6 The 
results are depicted in Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: Average results of the reasoning experiment for “pain,” “tissue damage,” 
“inflammation,” and “paper-clip”. Bars indicate standard errors around the means. 
                                                 
5 Participants were 54.0% women, with an average age of 36.6 years. 
6 Pain: t(43)=-5.44, p<0.001; tissue damage: t(44)=-4.67, p<0.001; inflammation: t(43)=-3.69, p<0.001; 
paper-clip: t(40)=10.038, p<0.001. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferonni-corrected) yielded no significant 
differences both between pain and tissue damage (t(86.512)=-0.23, p=.812), on the one hand, and pain and 
inflammation (t(85.62)=-1.02, p=0.308), on the other. The three comparisons with paper-clip were all 
significant (all p-values<0.001). There is some debate about whether it is appropriate to analyze Likert 
items using parametric tests. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.) While we 
believe that the use of t-tests is unlikely to cause serious problems in cases like this, we also analyzed the 
results using a non-parametric test. Wilcoxon signed rank tests confirmed the above findings, rejecting the 
hypotheses that the central tendency for pain (V=126.5, p<0.001), tissue damage (V=167, p<0.001), and 
inflammation (V=219.5, p<0.001) were greater than or equal to 4, and rejecting the hypothesis that the 
central tendency for paper-clip was less than or equal to 4 (V=724.5, p<0.001). 
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The results of our first study indicate that people do in fact tend to view the original pain-in-
mouth argument as failing. But they also tend to view the two arguments featuring bodily 
states—inflammation and tissue damage—as failing. Furthermore, the data from the paper-clip 
variation reveals that in uncontroversial cases with no misleading implications, the spatial 
reasoning scheme is accepted by almost everybody. These results are directly predicted by our 
account, but are not obviously predicted by either Tye’s account or Noordhof’s account. If the 
problem with the pain-in-mouth argument was simply that “pain” creates an intensional context, 
we would expect people to accept the arguments for “tissue damage” and “inflammation” since 
these do not create intensional contexts. Alternatively, if the problem was simply that “in” is used 
in a non-spatial sense in the first premise of the pain-in-mouth argument, we would again expect 
people to accept the arguments for “tissue damage” and “inflammation” since the “in” in these 
arguments would seem to be straightforwardly spatial. But they don’t. 
It should be noted, here, that these results do not necessarily show that the pain-in-mouth 
argument does not suffer from the problems that Tye and Noordhof identify. It is, of course, 
possible that one argument could go wrong in multiple ways. And it is possible that different 
people could find that an argument went wrong for different reasons. What the results do suggest, 
however, is that something further is going on here. The fact that people also reject versions of 
the argument where Tye’s and Noordhof’s explanations do not clearly apply, and do so to a 
roughly equal degree, indicates that a further explanation is called for. And our account provides 
just such an explanation.   
There are two primary objections that might be raised against the positive support we’ve offered 
for our explanation of the failure of the pain-in-mouth argument. First, it might be objected that 
“on” does not work the same as “in” in these arguments, such that the comparison case of “paper-
clip” is simply irrelevant. And absent a case in which people accept the relevant reasoning 
schema when the conclusion is not misleading, we have not adequately tested our explanation.7 
Second, it might be objected that while we have tested the extent to which the conclusions of the 
arguments are rejected in the first study, we relied on our own sense of how misleading the four 
conclusions were. Consequently, we cannot infer that the extent to which the conclusions are 
rejected corresponds with lay judgements about how misleading they are.  
To address these issues more thoroughly, we conducted a follow-up study in which we selected 
fourteen items that can reasonably be found in or on a finger: pain in, inflammation in, infection 
in, splinter in, broken bone in, tissue damage in, blood in, paper-clip on, cut on, nail on, perfume 
on, blood on, sore on, gasoline on. The study was conducted in two parts. The first part used a 
within-participants design to solicit judgments about how misleading the conclusion of the spatial 
reasoning schema was for each of these fourteen items. For each item, participants were asked the 
                                                 
7 To alleviate this concern, we tested the suggestion of a reviewer for this journal and ran the same 
argument with the item serum which is in a fingertip. The average rating of 37 participants was 5.93, 
clearly indicating that most participants did not believe that the argument failed when no misleading 
implicature was present. 
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following: 
If you were told that somebody had [item] in their mouth, how misleading would you 
consider that statement to be if you were later told that, in fact, the person had [item in/on] 
their thumb and that their thumb was in their mouth? 
Participants answered using a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 with “Very Misleading” and at 7 
with “Not at All Misleading.” The fourteen questions were counterbalanced for order. The second 
part of the study employed a between-participants design, with each member of a new set of 
participants being given the following prompt for just one of the fourteen items: 
Susan has [item in/on] her right thumb. Susan’s right thumb is in her mouth.  
Participants were then asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the claim, “There is [item] 
in Susan’s mouth,” answering on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 with “Strongly Disagree,” 
at 4 with “Neither Agree nor Disagree,” and at 7 with “Strongly Agree.” Responses for the first 
part of our study were collected from 70 participants.8 Responses for the second part of the study 
were collected from 560 participants (40 per item).9 Both parts were conducted using the 
Philosophical Personality website (http://philosophicalpersonality.com).  
The first thing to note is that the second part of our study served as a replication of our first 
experiment using a different source of participants. Results were comparable to those obtained in 
the first study for pain (M=2.25), tissue damage (M=2.55), inflammation (M=3.40), and paper-
clip (5.25). Once again, the mean response for each of the first three were significantly below the 
midpoint, whereas the mean value for the last was significantly above the midpoint.10 
Most importantly, our account predicts that the extent to which the conclusions are accepted will 
inversely correlate with the degree to which the conclusion is judged to be misleading. And that 
is exactly what we found. Two linear regression analyses were conducted, one for the means for 
all items and one only using the means for the items with the preposition “in.” Both correlations 
were highly significant. The regression line for all items is shown in Figure 2 below.11 
                                                 
8 Participants were 54.3% women, with an average age of 31.2 years. 
9 Participants were 64.8% women, with an average age of 34.6 years. 
10 Pain: t(39)=-6.60, p<0.001; tissue damage: t(39)=-4.94, p<0.001; inflammation: t(39)= 
-1.78, p=0.041; paper-clip: t(39)=3.88,  p<0.001. Wilcoxon signed rank tests confirmed the findings. Pain: 
V=48, p<0.001; tissue damage: V=53.5, p<0.001; inflammation: V=195.5, p=0.038; paper-clip: V=568, 
p<0.001. 
11 All items: F(1,12)=104.83, p<0.001, R2=0.897. Items with “in”: F(1,5)=11.79, p=0.019, R2=0.702. 
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Figure 2: Regression line indicating a correlation between the means for acceptance of the 
reasoning scheme with the means for misleadingness of the conclusions for all 14 tested items.  
 
While the results of our second experiment are consistent with our explanation, one should be wary  
of moving from correlation to causation. The results do not establish that the arguments are rejected 
because the conclusions are misleading. At the same time, the correlation we find calls out for 
explanation. And while our account predicts this finding, neither Tye’s account nor Noordhof’s account 
offers a direct explanation. Further, our account explains why we would find mean agreement with the 
arguments falling along a spectrum—we find this because the conclusions are not equally misleading. 
Neither of the other two accounts readily explains this aspect of our data, since the factors they call on 
to explain the failure of the pain-in-mouth argument do not obviously admit of gradation. That said, it 
might be argued that the gradation we find in mean agreement with the arguments is a population-level 
phenomenon that can be explained in terms of variation in the percentage of the population that reads 
the relevant term as creating an intensional context or reads “in” / “on” as state-attributive for a given 
argument. It is unclear, however, why such variation should be expected. 
Thus, given the results of our first two experiments, Occam’s razor would seem to support our 
explanation of the pain-in-mouth argument over the competition. Nonetheless, further research is 
called for with regard to our positive proposal. While space prevents us from fully carrying out 
that research here, we want to conclude with an initial experiment directly testing our account. 
If our explanation of the failure of the pain-in-mouth argument is generally correct, then we 
would expect agreement with the conclusion of the argument to rise if we prompt participants to 
ignore how the conclusion might be misleading and instead focus on whether the conclusion 
technically follows from the premises, such as:   
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Although it might sound misleading to say that there is a pain in Susan’s mouth, 
technically speaking there is a pain located in her mouth. 
In our third study, we tested the effect of this alternative wording of the conclusion by randomly 
assigning 244 participants to either the original form of the argument (used in Study 2) or the 
argument featuring the revised conclusion as exemplified above. Participants were given one of 
the four lowest-rated items from our second study and asked to assess the statement using the 
same scale. Responses were collected using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.12 As predicted, we 
found that responses for each item—pain (M=3.79), inflammation (M=4.14), cut (M=4.97), and 
tissue damage (M=4.66)—were significantly higher compared to the mean values of the standard 
argument: pain (M=2.10), inflammation (M=2.42), cut (M=2.66), and tissue damage (M=3.21).13 
Admittedly, the average ratings of the four tested items were still lower than for items like paper-
clip in our previous experiments. However, these differences likely reflect that our manipulation 
did not fully cancel the pragmatic implicature for all participants and/or that some participants 
did not recognize the technical sense of the terms suggested by the prompts. Further, since the 
means for all four items were depressed, there is no reason to think that this issue is specific to 
the pain prompt. Overall, the results of the third experiment provide further support for our 
account, indicating that the misleadingness of the conclusion is a significant factor in judgments 
that the pain-in-mouth argument fails. 
 
3. Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have cast doubt on the two primary accounts of the failure of the pain-in-mouth 
argument in the existing literature. We have also offered a third proposal, suggesting that the 
pain-in-mouth argument is not invalid, but rather fails for pragmatic reasons. And empirical data 
from three experiments provides initial support for our account.  
 
In closing, we would like to highlight that if our proposal is correct, then this paper provides 
support for a bodily conception of pain. Not only can the pain-in-mouth argument no longer be used 
to support a representationalist view of pain, the results suggest that pain is a state of the body, not 
of the mind. The semantics of reports like “there is pain in my fingertip,” taken at face value, tells 
us that pains are located in body parts. Sometimes it is ok to take the semantics at face value.  
                                                 
12 Participants were 47.2% women, with an average age of 38.4 years. 
13 We applied a 2 x 4 ANOVA with participants’ ratings as the dependent measure and the independent 
factors Type with two levels (original, revised) and Item with four levels (pain, inflammation, cut, tissue 
damage). The analysis revealed a highly significant main effect for Type, F(1, 236) = 48.71, p < 0.001, η2 
= .17, and Item, F(1, 236) = 3.19, p = 0.025, η2 = .04. No interaction was found between Type and Item, 
F(1, 236) = 0.54, p = 0.659, η2 < .01. In one sample tests, Cut (t(31)=2.55, p=0.016) was significantly and 
tissue damage (t(31)=1.84, p=0.074) was marginally significantly above the midpoint, but pain and 
inflammation were not. 
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